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SoFTWARE TYING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAws: A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
MELISSA HAMILTON*
INTRODUCTION
The computer software industry is plagued by the apparent conflict
between two major public policy issues: antitrust law and intellectual
property protection.1 The courts, as well as some commentators, view an-
titrust and intellectual property law as inherently adverse to each other.
2
This view, based on the assumption that antitrust laws are intended to pro-
mote vigorous competition while intellectual property laws provide an-
ticompetitive benefits to creators, incorrectly implies that intellectual
property protection inhibits the goals of the antitrust laws. As a conse-
quence, courts have developed rules in which certain conduct involving
intellectual property licensing is considered per se illegal under the anti-
trust laws.3
The belief that antitrust and intellectual property laws are naturally
adverse is erroneous because it fails to take adequately into consideration
the procompetitive impact of intellectual property laws. By allowing cre-
ators to benefit from their inventions, intellectual property laws encourage
the development of new technologies. Competition, and thereby con-
sumer interest, are advanced as a result of the availability of more choices,
new and better products and services, and lower prices.
4
* Assistant General Counsel, The Continuum Company, Inc.
1. "Intellectual property" is a term referring generally to patents, copyrights, trade
secrets and trademarks.
2. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the anticompetitive language contained in a software license, which restricted the licen-
see from developing competing products, was in flagrant disregard of the public policy em-
bedded in copyright law); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985)
(noting "tension between the antitrust laws and the public interest in the licensing of trade
secrets"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203
(2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash" when a patented
product is so successful that it evolves into its own economic market or engulfs a large share
of the preexisting product market), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); cf. United States v.
Loew's, Inc. 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) (affirming the rigorous antitrust rule that when a
tying product is patented or copyrighted, a presumption of sufficiency of economic power
exists); see also 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 6.05, 6.05[4] (1993) (not-
ing the "seeming dichotomy between trade secret and antitrust philosophy," and the "seem-
ing antinomy between the dictates of free competition encouraged by the antitrust laws and
the monopolistic privileges granted under the patent laws"); Daniel K. Dik, Note, Copyrighted
Software and Tying Arrangements: A Fresh Appreciatin for Per Se Ilegality, 10 COMPtrER/L.J. 413,
at 413 (1990) (stating that copyright and antitrust laws conflict when the "advantages and
tools appropriate to one sphere of activity are used to upset the workings of another sphere
of activity").
3. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Charles F. Rule, Technology Licensing and the Second American Revolu-
tion: Storming the Ramparts of Antitrust and Misuse, Statement at The John Marshall Law
School (Feb. 22, 1985), in 4 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, app. H-3; Roger B.
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The general rule that the law tends to lag significantly behind techno-
logical advances finds no exception in the case of software. The primary
reason is that traditional legal concepts do not always operate well with
complex and innovative technologies, such as computer software. The ef-
fect of the law's failure to keep pace with the software industry is exempli-
fied by the obstacles encountered in gaining legal protection for software
using traditional laws. While advances have been made to the extent that
patent, copyright, and state trade secret laws, or a combination thereof,5
are now available as a general matter to software developers, there is still
much confusion concerning which features of a software product are pro-
tected under which law.6 One of the lessons learned in the struggle to
obtain intellectual property law protection is that the complex character
of software technology often demands special treatment in affected areas
of law.
Just as traditional intellectual property laws have required new inter-
pretations or formal amendments to include the protection of software,
the formalistic approach of the antitrust laws requires modification. Tech-
nological innovation is the key to competition in the software market. In
order to succeed in the marketplace, software developers must create
more functional and efficient programs.7 Intellectual property laws en-
courage innovation, which should not be abrogated by antitrust laws.
Perhaps the most prominent issue affecting the software industry in
terms of the interrelationship between antitrust and intellectual property
law occurs in tying cases. In a tying arrangement, the seller agrees to sell
one product, referred to as the tying product, on the condition that the
purchaser also buy from the seller a different product, referred to as the
tied product.8 Generally, a tying agreement is considered a per se viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9
Andewelt, The Antitrust Division's Perspective on Intellectual Property Protection and Li-
censing - The Past, The Present and The Future, Remarks before the American Bar Associa-
tion, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section (July 16, 1985), in 4 MitLGIM ON TRADE
SEcRET-rs, supra note 2, at App. H-4.
5. See discussion infra part I.
6. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
7. The functionality of software generally means the tasks or jobs that a software pro-
gram is able to perform. The ability to perform a certain mathematical calculation or pro-
vide a layout for a spreadsheet are examples of software functionality. The efficiency of
software may be improved by enhancing the speed or accuracy of the program itself or alter-
ing the program so that it uses less computer central processing unit resources.
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Tying arrangements in
which the tying product is conditioned upon the purchase of the tied item are generally
known as "tie-ins." Another form of tying arrangement exists when the seller conditions the
sale of the tying product upon the purchaser's agreement not to deal with the seller's com-
petitors in the tied product. The latter form of tying is generally known as "tie-outs." Tying
arrangements apply both to the traditional sale of goods and services, as well as to licenses of
intellectual property. See discussion infra part IV.
9. Former Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) (FortnerI)
(adopting language from Northern Pac. Ry. 356 U.S. 1, at 5-6).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), amended by
Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
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Software vendors commonly bundle maintenance services10 with the
licensing of their software products. While there may be many reasons for
such bundling, some of the major motivations include discouraging re-
verse engineering1 1 and intellectual property infringement, enhancing
product efficiency and quality,12 and promoting consumer acceptance of
the tying product.13 By marketing the software license in conjunction
with maintenance services, the software licensor may, however, be expos-
ing itself to antitrust liability for illegal tying. The software license could
be construed as a tying product and the maintenance services as the tied
product. 14 Most tying arrangements are condemned as being per se an-
ticompetitive in nature. 15 Courts may inadvisably use the same rigid prin-
ciples developed in other cases to condemn bundling of software and
10. See genera/iy, John C. Yates & Anthony E. DiResta, Software Support and Hardware Main-
tenance Practices: Tying Considerations, 8 COMPUTER LAw. 17, 18-19 (1991) (software mainte-
nance services may include a variety of services; such as fixing errors, enhancing the
functionality or efficiency of the product, providing telephone support, education and train-
ing, software installation, and general consulting services).
The bundled maintenance services may be in the form of a warranty or an actual service
agreement. For example, a software license may contain an extended warranty period dur-
ing which the licensor may fix software defects and provide software upgrades. Alternatively,
the licensee may obtain a license contract, as well as a services agreement, requiring the
licensor to provide similar support. Whether by warranty or service contract, however, the
vendor is, in effect, providing maintenance services in addition to granting the software
license.
11. Reverse engineering is the act of "starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture." Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Computer software is generally written in
source code, understandable by a skilled computer programmer, but not by a computer. To
be processed by a computer, the source code is translated into machine readable language,
known as object code, consisting of a series of O's and l's. Object code is generally indeci-
pherable by humans. Because many software developers regard their source code as trade
secrets, they typically will allow their licensees access to object code only. To reverse engi-
neer, a licensee would have to work backward from the object code to reveal the structure
and organization of the program.
12. Producing a quality end product is another important goal in achieving market ac-
ceptance. See generally EUGENE M. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 105
(1981) (stressing, from an economic viewpoint, that tying arrangements are both elementary
and commonplace market practices for goods).
13. As software invariably contains defects, or "bugs," developers desire a relationship
whereby the user is motivated to report errors and the developer has the opportunity to
correct them. This leads to establishing goodwill with current and future customers and to
improving product performance. There are many other reasons vendors bundle software
and maintenance. By gaining services revenues, the vendor assures itself an income stream,
as well as guaranteed funding for future research and development. A less laudable motive is
a desire to exclude competition in the service market. For a discussion of the benefits in
combining software with maintenance services, see Yates & DiResta, supra note 10, at 17-18.
Licensees also benefit from the purchase of software and maintenance services together.
This package allows the licensee to use the functionality currently in the software, and simul-
taneously obtain the rights to enhancements developed later. Also, the purchase fee for a
software and maintenance services package when the software is substantially incomplete may
be materially lower than the license fee would be when the development of the software has
significantly progressed.
14. A private party plaintiff may sue under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), and if successful, recover treble damages, costs, attorney's fees, and interest
from the date the suit was filed. Id.
15. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
1994]
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maintenance without considering the underlying procompetitive
aspects.1 6
In general, this Article argues that the application of antitrust princi-
ples to software licensing arrangements requires special consideration.
Special treatment is particularly warranted because, unlike the traditional
sale of goods, the proper antitrust analysis for software technology often
involves the principles of both copyright and trade secrets. Moreover, the
inflexible application of the rigid tying rules would curtail the fundamen-
tal economic and functional benefits a software developer may achieve by
packaging software licenses with maintenance services, but would not pro-
vide any tangible benefit to consumers. The procompetitive effects of
software innovation should be recognized and a more flexible antitrust
approach for software taken. Consideration of the impact on competitive
conditions, rather than the application of the per se analysis to software
tying packages, would preserve the benefits of software innovation yet pro-
vide competitors some protection against blatant anticompetitive conduct.
Part I of this Article offers a brief review of intellectual property rights
and software technology. Part II provides a general overview of judicially
established antitrust tying rules. In Parts III and IV, certain elements of
per se tying cases are analyzed in the context of software/maintenance
packages. Part III focuses on the tying requirement that there be separate
products, and concludes that software and maintenance should be consid-
ered a single product. Part IV analyzes the judicial presumption that a
copyrighted software product creates unlawful market power. This section
concludes that this presumption is unsupported by economic reality, is
falsely based on an analogy to patent law, and is inappropriate for software
products, because the real value of software tends to be its underlying un-
copyrightable functionality and not any market power gained solely from
the copyright laws. Finally, Part V acknowledges that courts have been
willing to recognize exceptions to the per se rules when the challenged
activity is not likely to unreasonably restrict competitive conditions.
I. SUMMARY OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE
Legal protection for intellectual property is designed to balance the
policy of promoting intellectual creativity with the public interest in gain-
ing access to the creations.1 7 Innovators are motivated to release their
inventions to the public in return for certain exclusive rights which serve
to protect their investment.1 8 The public benefits from access to creative
16. SeeVirtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1323 (6th Cir.
1992) (ruling that software support was itself a separate market from hardware mainte-
nance), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 315 (1992); ROGER M. MILGRAM, MILGRIM ON LICENS-
ING § 8.23, at 8-81 (1992) (stating that a software licensee might "forcefully assert that the
requirement that it procure maintenance services from the licensor of the copyrighted
software programs is improper").
17. The Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
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genius and possession of the creative results upon expiration of the crea-
tor's statutory control. 19
The unique nature of software technology has tested the limits of in-
tellectual property law. Attempts to apply traditional intellectual property
rules to software have been frustrated, due mainly to the limitations in the
statutory language and strict application of traditional laws.20 As a result
of such obstacles, and in recognition of the increasing importance of the
software industry in the economy today, the law is rapidly changing to
meet the needs of software developers in protecting the value and integ-
rity of their work. A variety of intellectual property laws now encompasses
software technology.
Copyright protection is one of the primary means of legal protection
for computer programs. In general, copyright law protects original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.21 The scope of
the protection extends to the expression of an idea, rather than to the
idea itself.22 Thus, ideas are not in and of themselves copyrightable.
23
Moreover, when the idea and the expression are indistinguishable, the ex-
pression is not protected under copyright law. 24 In the context of
software, this means that copyright law will not protect a program if there
is only one essential means of accomplishing a certain task.
25
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work,
adapt or make derivative works, publicly distribute copies, publicly per-
form the work, and display the work.26 The exclusive rights last for the life
of the author plus fifty years in the case of a real person.2 7 If the author is
an entity or is anonymous, or if it is a work made for hire, 28 the rights last
for seventy-five years from publication or one hundred years from crea-
tion, whichever occurs first.29 Once registered with the Copyright Office,
a copyright holder may bring suit to recover damages and to obtain in-
junctive relief for infringement of the copyright.
30
19. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
20. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (D. Colo. 1992)
(recognizing that "copyright law was not designed to accommodate computer software pro-
tection"), affd in part, vacated in par, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
24. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986).
25. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27. Id. § 302(a).
28. A work made for hire is typically created by an employee at the direction of his or
her employer. The ownership of a work for hire resides with the employer. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1988). The Supreme Court delineated thirteen factors to guide courts in deter-
mining whether the work was performed as an employee or by an independent contractor.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (enumerating
relevant factors in determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general com-
mon law of agency).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
30. Id. §§ 501-02, 504-05. The prevailing copyright holder may be awarded actual dam-
ages and profits or statutory damages in certain circumstances. Id. § 504. In addition, costs
and attorneys' fees may be awarded. Id. § 505.
1994]
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Copyright protection has its limitations. Copyright law does not pro-
hibit others from borrowing the idea underlying a copyrighted product
and creating their own original expression.3 ' Likewise, others are free to
develop independently their own material.3 2 Provided that unlawful copy-
ing has not occurred, an independently developed product will not be an
infringement even if it is substantially similar to a prior copyrighted
product."3
Some of the uncertainty about the scope of the applicability of copy-
right law to software technology has been resolved. The Copyright Act of
1976 eliminated concern that computer programs were not fixed in a tan-
gible medium of expression (as required for copyright protection) by clar-
ifying that a work could be fixed even if it is readable only by a machine.
3 4
Further, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1980 to include ex-
pressly computer programs as a literary work within the definition of
works of authorship.3 5 Copyright protection has been applied to the lit-
eral elements of a program, which include the source and object codes.
3 6
The real difficulty in determining whether copyright protection applies to
nonliteral aspects of a computer program lies in differentiating the idea
from the expression.
In a controversial decision, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labo-
ratory, Inc., the Third Circuit ruled that the structure, sequence, and or-
ganization of a program were protected by copyright.3 7 Whether Whelan is
correct and whether copyright protection exists for other aspects of
software than the source and object codes remain open issues.38 For in-
stance, copyright protection may not extend to data formats, program
structure, the "look and feel," data bases, or user interfaces. 39 Thus, while
most software developers use the copyright law to protect their software,
the extent of such protection is still open for interpretation.
31. 'Id. § 102(b).
32. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
34. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
35. Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1981) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
36. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. I1. 1983).
37. 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (the test for differentiating between idea and
expression focuses upon the end sought to be achieved by the work in question), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Thus, the purpose or function of a program would be the work's idea,
and everything not necessary for such purpose or function would be part of the expression.
Id. at 1236.
38. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting Whelan in favor of a three part "successive filtration" test for detennining if the
offending software is substantially similar to the copyrighted software).
39. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (rejecting
copyright claim for factual content of data base); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 57 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that certain basic elements of the interface
were not copyrightable); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (ruling that input formats are not copyrightable, nor are
the ordering and sequencing of a computer program).
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Software developers also commonly seek the protection of trade se-
cret laws. A trade secret can be generally described as any formula, pro-
cess, pattern, or compilation of confidential information that gives one a
business advantage over competitors who do not know it.4° State law,
rather than federal statute, generally governs trade secret protection. In
contrast to both the copyright and patent laws, there has been little doubt
that computer software may be a trade secret.41 It is also commonly ac-
cepted that copyright law does not preempt trade secret rights.
42
A trade secret owner obtains certain rights to prohibit unauthorized
use or disclosure by those to whom the secret is confidentially revealed.
43
Trade secret law also provides a remedy against those who have obtained
the secret through improper means, such as by theft or deception. 44
To obtain protection, the owner of a trade secret must take reason-
able steps to maintain its secrecy.4 5 Trade secrecy protection lasts only as
long as secrecy is maintained.4 6 Legal protection may therefore be lost
even if the secret is inadvertently disclosed. Consequently, software li-
cense agreements generally require the licensee to keep confidential the
software product licensed.
To a limited degree, patents may protect qualifying aspects of a com-
puter program. 47 To be patentable, an invention must be new, useful, and
nonobvious to one skilled in the particular subject matter.48 Though
ideas are excluded from copyright protection, the concrete embodiments
of ideas or principles are patentable if they meet the requirements for
patentability. This means that ideas reduced to practices, methods, or for-
mulas are patentable.
49
Patent law provides greater rights than either copyright or trade
secrets. By obtaining a patent, the holder may preclude independent cre-
40. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (1985); RESTATEMENT (Firsr) OF TORTS § 757 CmL b
(1939).
41. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d
733, 743 (Okla. 1980); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1020 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 301(B)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (copyright law does not preempt
violations of law that are not equivalent to the exclusive rights granted by the copyright act);
cf. Motorola, Inc. v. Computer Displays Int'l, Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984) (af-
firming trial court's application of a patent law doctrine in an analogous trade secret case);
Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("[N]either Congress nor the courts have viewed the federal-Copyright Act as preempting the
common law of trade secret misappropriation."). But cf. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs.,
564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983) (protection under patent or copyright law precludes
relief under state unfair competition or misappropriation law).
43. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
44. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
45. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
46. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4)(ii) (1985).
47. See generaUy D.C. TOEDT III, THE LAW AND BusiNEss OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 5
(1993).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988).
49. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-78 (1974).
1994]
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ation of the work even where no copying has occurred. 50 Patents provide
exclusive rights to manufacture, use, and sell the product or process.5 1
These exclusive rights last for a period of 17 years.5 2 In return for receiv-
ing these exclusive rights, the patent applicant must publicly disclose the
invention.
5 s
Despite the broader exclusive rights provided by a patent, software
developers rarely seek patent protection. 54 The patent application pro-
cess is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive.55 Given the limited
instances in which software is patentable, the failure to patent software is
understandable. Also, to the extent a software developer discloses the in-
vention, any trade secret protection thereof may be lost. In such circum-
stances, protecting software under either copyright or trade secret laws
may be preferable.
Thus, copyright, trade secrets, and to a limited degree, patents, are
each available to protect computer software. Software developers com-
monly use a combination of the three. The extent to which each is used
depends upon the characteristics of the particular program, as well as indi-
vidual needs.
II. ANTITRUST TYING RuLEs
Tying arrangements are generally challenged under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.56 Section 1 prohibits every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade.57 Taken literally, the broad language of the
statute could be construed to prohibit virtually any joint activity that af-
fects trade, whether competitively desirable or not.58 Recognizing this co-
nundrum, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the statute to prohibit
only concerted restraints that unreasonably restrict competitive condi-
tions.5 9 Two general lines of analysis have been created regarding the
proof of an unreasonable restraint: per se analysis and the rule of reason.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. Id
52. Id. § 154.
53. Id § 112.
54. Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative, COMPUTER
LAw. 1 (Apr. 1986).
55. See 1 GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAw (CCH) 3,000, at 5005 (1989).
56. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp IV 1992). Tying arrangements may also
be unlawful under § 3 of The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), if the tying
involves commodities. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1936). The Clayton Act
does not, however, prohibit conduct relating to services or intangibles. See Crossland v. Can-
teen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 718 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (for a Clayton Act claim, both the tied and
tying products are required to be goods); infra note 132 and accompanying text.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
58. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) ("Were § 1 to be
read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it.").
59. Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979). In acknowledging that Congress did not intend to proscribe in the Sherman Act all
the types of conduct that may be anticompetitive, the Court drew upon the legislative history
which indicated that Congress expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad lan-
guage. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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The standard per se analysis holds that certain practices are so plainly
anticompetitive and without redeeming value that they are per se, or pre-
sumptively, unreasonable.60 The Supreme Court explained that use of the
per se analysis helps to "avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market
conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is
so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the par-
ticular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct."6l The consequences
of applying per se analysis are severe. Once a plaintiff establishes that the
practice occurred, the plaintiff need not affirmatively prove the practice
was competitively unreasonable. 6 2 The per se rule assumes the negative
impact on the industry, and the defendant does not have the opportunity
to justify the action as being reasonable. 63 Because of the extreme handi-
cap it places on a defendant, courts generally apply the per se analysis only
to certain types of trade practices that, from long experience, "always or
almost always tend to restrict competition."
64
While it has been generally stated that a tying arrangement is pre-
sumptively illegal under the per se rule,65 in reality a quasi per se analysis
is used: after a plaintiff proves that a tying occurred, the defendant still
has the opportunity to vindicate its actions as being competitively reason-
able.66 The ability of the defendant to offer a business justification to de-
60. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58
(1977).
61. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 n.25 (1984). See NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) ("Per se rules are invoked when surrounding
circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjusti-
fied further examination of the challenged conduct."); Verson Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prods.
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (certain activity is so predominantly anticompetitive
that it is considered to be illegal per se).
62. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,483, at 60,031 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Verson Wkins Ltd., 723 F. Supp. at 6.
64. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
One of the most common types of practices in which per se analysis is applied is horizontal
and vertical price fixing. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For other applications, includ-
ing horizontal market divisions, group boycotts and bad faith negotiations, see, e.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (horizontal and vertical market re-
straints); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (group boycotts and
refusals to deal). Cf R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. 1
67,483, at 60,032 (9th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to suppress megawatts of steam output).
65. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984); Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 976 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1978).
66. Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350-51 (9th
Cir. 1987) (accepting business justification for tying as a legitimate means of maintaining
quality control, thereby protecting reputation of manufacturer), cert. denied 488 U.S. 870
(1988); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964) (permitting tie to protect
trademark by ensuring product quality control), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehy-
drating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir.) (allowingjustification
that the two products did not work properly independently from each other and could not
reasonably be manufactured independently), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States
v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (allowing tying arrangement
until business established), affid per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see aLso Xeta, Inc. v. Atex,
Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (no illegal tying shown where plaintiff failed to
1994]
DENVER UN!VERSITY LAW REVIEW
fend itself against a per se tying claim is, therefore, a variation of the strict
per se rule applied to other types of conduct.
The antitrust concern with tying arrangements is that they may fore-
close competition in the market for the tied product.6 7 When buyers are
forced to purchase a particular product, competition in the relevant mar-
ket is lessened.68 The Supreme Court has expressed its strong bias against
tying: "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition." 69 Public policy disfavors the possibility that poten-
tially substandard products are insulated from competitive forces.
70
Like all other Section 1 claims, the plaintiff asserting an unlawful ty-
ing violation must prove an agreement or conspiracy by two or more per-
sons. For a software license/maintenance service package, concerted
action can be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence that the tying
party sold the software license to its customers on the condition that they
also purchase the maintenance services. 7 1 For instance, a conspiracy can
show that the alleged tie of software and hardware was unreasonable). But see United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962) (after a tying arrangement is proven, courts need
not make any "elaborate inquiry" into the business reasons for its use) (citing Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
If, however, the plaintiff does not demonstrate a Section 1 per se tying arrangement,
then the defendant's conduct is examined under the "rule of reason" test to determine if it
unreasonably restrained competition. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-18, 29; Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1038 (1984). Unlike the limited analysis dictated by the per se doctrine, the rule of reason
test requires a court to examine the various market factors that bear upon whether a particu-
lar practice is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
29.
[T] he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive signifi-
cance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in
the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry .... [T] hat policy
decision has been made by the Congress.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). A court will
consider the adverse impact of the alleged illegal practice on competitive conditions in the
relevant industry. Id. at 688. A plaintiff's mere assertion that the defendant's action ad-
versely affected the plaintiff will not support an antitrust claim without proof of generalized
injury to the market. In addition to showing general market impact, the rule of reason re-
quires consideration of whether the restraint had a substantially adverse effect on competi-
tion which outweighs any positive competitive aspects of the restraint. R.C. Dick Geothermal
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. 67,483, at 60,033 (9th Cir. 1987); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
67. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6. Tying arrangements "deny competitors free access to
the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market." Id.
68. See id. ("buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products");
Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1475 (D.N.J. 1984) (quoting Northern
Pac. Ry.); see also Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 666-68 (1982); W. David Slawson, A New Concept of Compe-
tition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, 30 ANTITRusr BuL.. 257, 264 (1985); Note, The
Economic Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58
FoRDHAm L. Rev. 1353, 1358-59 (1990).
69. Loews, 371 U.S. at 44 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-
06 (1949)).
70. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-15 (citing, inter alia, Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 509); see also
Innovation Data Processing, 585 F. Supp. at 1475.
71. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1992)
(rejecting the argument of a "unified market" because some consumers would purchase
either service or parts alone). But see McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 368 (10th Cir.
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be shown by an express refusal to license the software without the
purchase of the maintenance services or by other evidence that the licen-
sor would cancel the license if the customer refused to purchase mainte-
nance services.
7 2
In addition to proving concerted action, the plaintiff alleging a tying
violation must prove four elements. First, the plaintiff must show the ar-
rangement involves two distinct products or services.73 The plaintiff must
then show an actual tie exists. 74 Third, proof is required that the defend-
ant has appreciable economic power in the tying market.75 Finally, the
arrangement must affect a substantial volume of interstate commerce.
7 6
As relatively small sums are deemed to implicate a substantial volume of
commerce, this final element deserves scant review. 77 The remaining ele-
ments, however, will be discussed in more detail.
The rule that the tying product and the tied product must be separate
items implies separate customer demand for each product so that it is effi-
1988) (finding a single supplier's imposition of a tying arrangement upon its customers was
not sufficient evidence of concerted activity); Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs., Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 179, 182 (D. Colo. 1992) (in a case involving the packaging of software maintenance
services and hardware maintenance services, court held that: "A contract between a cus-
tomer and the seller in an alleged tying scheme does not establish a [Sherman Act] Section 1
conspiracy.").
72. See, e.g., Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1499-1500 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
73. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Jefferson Parish,
466 U.S. at 21-22).
74. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958). Some courts combine the
first two elements as a single element. See, e.g., Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1323 (6th Cir.) (requiring "tying arrangement between two distinct prod-
ucts or services"), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992); Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n.
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring "[t]wo distinct
products or services [that] are in fact tied such that the products are offered as a single pack-
age"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985); see also Dik, supra note 2, at 428.
75. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Jefferson Parish,
466 U.S. at 13-14).
76. There is some debate as to the requirement of a fifth element, namely that the
plaintiff must also show that the defendant has an economic stake in the tied item. Although
there is no Supreme Court precedent on this issue, lower courts are divided on the require-
ment that the seller have an economic interest in the tying product market. Compare Beard v.
Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 142-43 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring proof of economic interest in
the tying product market); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712
(11th Cir. 1984) (same); Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condo-
minium Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) with Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's
House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1517 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting proof of eco-
nomic interest in the tied product as an element of a per se tying case) and Parts & Elec.
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987) (court's discussion on issue of
market power in the tied product market as a required element, in light of Supreme Court's
absence of direction on same issue, skirted by plaintiffs failure to preserve the issue for
judgment n.o.v. purposes), cert. denied 493 U.S. 847 (1989). See generally, Note, The Economic
Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements, supra note 68, at 1362-63.
77. See, e.g., Fortner , 394 U.S. at 501-02 ($190,000); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 49 (1962) ($60,800); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1980)
($600,000). The volume of commerce affected must simply be "substantial enough in terms
of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis." Fortner , 394 U.S. at 501. For a more
complete listing of dollar amounts which have been accepted as being a substantial amount,
or rejected, see 9 PiLntip E. AREEDA, AN-rrraus-r LAw 1721b4, at 273-75 (1991) (as little as
$10,000 has been accepted as "substantial").
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cient for a firm to offer the products separately.78 Relevant factors in de-
termining distinctness include whether the tying party or its competitors
offer the products separately or only as a single package, 79 whether the
prices for the products are set individually or only as a lump sum,80 and
whether purchasers perceive the items as separate or as a single, combined
package. It may be evident in many cases that products are indeed sepa-
rate. Salt machines and salt are distinct products,8 ' as are film projectors
and film.8 2 In close cases, nonetheless, the standards for determining
whether two distinct products exist are less clear.83 Products may still be
considered distinct although they are functionally co-dependent in the
sense that one is worthless without the other.84 Thus, tabulators and
punch cards are distinct items despite the uselessness of the tabulator
without the cards.
8 5
The second element of a tying claim requires a showing that the ac-
quisition of the tying product was conditioned upon the purchaser also
buying the tied product.86 A tie occurs when the buyer is coerced or
forced into taking the tied item as a condition of acquiring the tying prod-
uct. The condition may be clearly set forth in an explicit agreement, or it
may be shown by the tying party's policy, which results in the purchase of
the tying and tied products together, as being "the only viable economic
option."8 7 However, no illegal tie exists when the purchaser desires to buy
the tied item from the same seller or if the purchaser can buy the tying
product elsewhere; in either case, the purchaser's freedom to buy the ty-
ing and tied items separately is not restrained.8 8 Likewise, antitrust liabil-
ity will not arise in situations where the seller offers the tying product
separately from the tied product at a reasonable price.
8 9
78. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22.
79. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (evidence that service
and parts had been sold separately in the past deemed relevant).
80. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228, 233 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (deter-
mining that disk drive unit and head/disk assembly were a single product, because of an
industry practice to sell the combined unit for a single price).
81. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1947).
82. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
83. Compare Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no
tie existed where a license to use the franchisor's trade name, lease of the restaurant prop-
erty, and note were part of a single franchise package), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) with
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding a tie could exist
between a trademark license and a lease of the locational property used by the franchisee),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
84. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 n.30 (1984).
85. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
86. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
87. Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 638
F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th
Cir. 1990) (no tying of school class photos to individual portraits where students could
purchase their portraits elsewhere).
89. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6 n.4 (noting no tying arrangement where the buyer
may buy either product by itself, even though the seller also offers the two products together
at a single price); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-74 & n.6 (4th Cir 1990)
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This concept of forcing is not difficult to prove in the case of a
software and maintenance service package when the vendor refuses to li-
cense the software separately. Obviously, there is no tying violation if the
vendor offers the software license alone. But if development of the
software is substantially incomplete, then a license of such undeveloped
software may not be practical and the licensor would lose funding for fur-
ther development. Yet the vendor with a viable software product may still
find marketing a license without maintenance an unacceptable alterna-
tive, considering that the licensor would lose the economic and functional
advantages derived from the bundling.90 Accordingly, the software ven-
dor who markets the software/maintenance package must rely upon the
absence of the first element of a tying claim, separate products, or the
third element, appreciable economic power.
The third element in proving a tying claim requires that the defend-
ant have appreciable economic power in the tying product that gives the
defendant a significant advantage over competitors and thus enables the
defendant to condition effectively the availability of the tying item on ac-
ceptance of the tied item.9 1 In tying cases, courts have made it clear that
in some circumstances only a modest degree of market power is needed to
show appreciable economic power.92 Neither monopoly power nor a sig-
nificant market share is always required.93 Economic power in the tying
market, therefore, need not be absolute so long as the power exists as to
some buyers in the market.
94
Appreciable economic power can be shown in one of three ways.
First, economic power arises when the defendant has a dominant position
in the tying market.95 While monopoly power is not required, a tying
party with a significant market share is likely to hold a dominant position
in the tying market.9 6 Second, even without a significant market share,
economic power can be shown when a substantial number of individuals
acquiesce to the tie and there is no rational reason for that acquiescence
other than the tying arrangement itself.97 The third method of proving
(computer hardware and software were held not tied when the software could be licensed
separately at a reasonable price).
90. See Glen P. Belvis, Computers, Copyright & Tying Agreements: An Argument For the Aban-
donment of the Presumption of Market Power, 28 B.C. L. REv. 265, 279 (1987).
91. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1992); see
Fortner , 394 U.S. at 503. Some economists, though, believe that ties effectively reduce com-
petition, regardless of the presence of market power. See Slawson, supra note 68, at 270-72.
92. United States Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (Fortner
I); Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 502-04.
93. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; Fortner L 394 U.S. at 502-04. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 259 (1987) (analysis
of the difference between economic power, monopoly power and market share).
94. FortnerL, 394 U.S. at 503; Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1340-
41 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
95. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984).
96. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (control of over 80% of the tying
market represented a dominant position in that market). But see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
26 (30% of market share was insufficient to establish market power).
97. Cf Fortneri, 429 U.S. at 618 n.10; Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-49
(5th Cir. 1976).
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appreciable economic power arises in the case of tying products that are
somehow unique. A presumption of economic power is created when the
tying product is substantially cheaper than competing products98 or the
product has no substitutes.99 The presumption also has been applied
when the uniqueness of the product results from legal advantages ob-
tained from patent laws.' 0 0
If the proof is sufficient to establish a tying arrangement, the defend-
ant may offer evidence of business justifications for the tie.10 ' In Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,10 2 Kodak offered three business
justifications for its tying of parts and services: maintaining high quality
service, reducing inventory costs, and preventing third party service prov-
iders from free-riding on Kodak's investment in equipment, parts, and ser-
vice.103 The Court, however, rejected each justification, concluding that
the first was pretextual, the second was contrary to the evidence, and the
third had "no support in our caselaw." 10 4 Thus, if the Kodak decision is
any indication, the modern view appears to be that a business justification
will undergo tough scrutiny by the courts.10 5 It is unclear what type of
justification a court would likely accept. Accordingly, in examining the
antitrust implications of a software/maintenance package, it is necessary
to focus on the two weakest elements of a software tying case: separate
products and market power.
III. SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE
An illegal tying arrangement requires the existence of two distinct
products. 10 6 Courts have addressed this issue in several cases involving
computer hardware and software industries. Both Virtual Maintenance, Inc.
v. Prime Computer, Inc.,10 7 and Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 10 8 in-
volved purported ties between software maintenance services and hard-
ware maintenance. In Virtual Maintenance, the defendant sold software
support services10 9 separately at a large premium above the price it
charged for software support and hardware maintenance together.
10
98. E.g., Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 622.
99. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 1 (1958) (control over large
tracts of land); Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th
Cir. 1989) (burial markers to burial plots), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990).
100. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
101. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
102. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
103. Id. at 2091.
104. Id. at 2091-92.
105. A number of business justifications have been struck down by the Court over the
years. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962) (the need to fulfill con-
tractual commitments involving restrictive covenants); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (quality control); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (same).
106. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
107. 957 F.2d 1318 (6th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (vacated
and remanded for further consideration in light of Kodak).
108. 941 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1667 (1992).
109. The support services in this case included revisions, modifications, and updates. Vir-




The defendant in Datagate was accused of threatening to withhold software
maintenance unless customers also purchased hardware maintenance
services."' In both cases, the courts found software maintenance and
hardware maintenance to be distinct products because of separate con-
sumer demand for each product. 112 Although neither court directly ad-
dressed the distinctions between software maintenance and the
underlying software, both recognized that software maintenance services,
at least in some circumstances, will be considered separate products.
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,113 the district
court ruled that a manufacturer's diagnostic software and its computer
equipment repair services were separate products, despite evidence that
the diagnostic software was useful only in servicing the same computer
equipment. The manufacturer denied a software license request from
some customers who desired to have a third party service provider use the
diagnostic software to provide them with computer repair services. Be-
cause the manufacturer was willing to license the diagnostic software inde-
pendently to companies who provided their own repair services, it was
feasible to offer the software and repair services separately.
114
The same defendant and virtually the same set of facts arose in Service
& Training Inc. v. Data General Corp.1 15 The district court ruled that since
the diagnostic software was "merely one feature of Data General's inte-
grated and unified product - computer servicing," and the only purpose
of the software was to repair computer systems, the diagnostic software
and repair services were "inextricably bound together." 116 The appellate
court overruled the trial court, agreeing with the Grumman Systems court
that diagnostic software and repair services were two distinct products.
117
The Fourth Circuit found insufficient evidence of separate products be-
cause the defendant, while willing to license the diagnostic software alone
to certain companies, produced no evidence that there was consumer de-
mand for such services.
11 8
The same defendant reappeared in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp.' 19 This time, however, the defendant tied the sale of its central
processing unit to the licensing of its operating system. Because there was
customer demand for each product separately and the products could be
provided separately, the court found that the central processing unit and
the software were separate items capable of being tied.120 The central
111. Datagate, 941 F.2d at 866.
112. Virtual Maintenance, 957 F.2d at 1323; Datagate, 941 F.2d at 870.
113. 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass. 1991).
114. Id. at 193.
115. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 684 (citing Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 737 F. Supp. 334,
343 (D. Md. 1990)).
117. Id. at 684.
118. Id. at 685. In the end, though, the court found no tie because of the lack of proof of
a conspiracy. Id. at 685-88.
119. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
120. Id. at 1338-39; see also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-73 & n.6
(4th Cir. 1990) (computer hardware and software could be distinct items); 3 P.M., Inc. v.
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theme of Digidyne and similar cases is that courts are quite willing to find
distinct products in computer-related industries.
The recent decision in Kodak, while not involving computer systems,
also may have a strong impact on analyzing the existence of distinct mar-
kets where services for technology products are involved. The Supreme
Court in Kodak noted that "the development of the entire high-technology
service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for ser-
vice." 12 1 The Court thereby found that there could be a market for serv-
icing Kodak copier equipment that was separate from the market for
Kodak copier parts. The Court possibly was influenced by the number of
third party suppliers of copier maintenance services already in existence
that were affected adversely by Kodak's policy. Some believe that Kodak
stands for the rule that, in cases of tying a high-technology product and
related services, there is always a services market separate from the market
for the product itself.1 22 Thus Kodak, together with Virtual Maintenance,
Datagate, and the rest, may form the basis for a court to conclude that
software and services are separate markets.
Despite this case law, a tying claim involving software and services war-
rants a different conclusion based upon the unique characteristics of
software technology. The impact of Kodak on a software tie ought to be
minimal. The decision was on a summary judgment ruling, holding only
that the existence of separate products is properly a fact determination
that requires a trial on the merits.' 23 Moreover, the Kodak Court's com-
ment concerning the high-technology industry should properly be consid-
ered dictum, or in any case, not applied to software. Contrary to Kodak's
broad pronouncement of the distinctness of service markets in high tech-
nology industries, maintenance services for software products are funda-
mentally different. Likewise, tying arrangements between hardware and
software are not entirely analogous to those between software and related
services. While there is reason to believe that the hardware and software
markets are distinct markets, any division between software and mainte-
nance services is not so clearly defined. Consumers commonly purchase
licenses to software and maintenance services in packages, or at least
purchase software maintenance from the same vendor that developed the
software.
Bundling of software licenses with maintenance services is a common
practice. Such practice promotes efficiency by allowing the developer to
improve product performance after the initial license sale, which in turn
serves to promote consumer acceptance of the product. Customers, con-
sequently, benefit by access to the developer's improvements. Indeed, the
innovative capability of the developer can be a primary consideration of
Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1354-55 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (computer hardware prod-
ucts and computer maintenance services were distinct items).
121. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. CL 2072, 2080 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Donald F. Blumberg, Eastman Kodak: The Strategic Implications for the Field
Service Industhy, 9 COMPUTER LAW. 18, 19 (1992).
123. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. CL at 2080 ("Enough doubt is
cast on Kodak's claim of a unified market that it should be resolved by the trier of fact.").
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potential software licensees who appraise the future promise of the
software in addition to evaluating the current technology. Inasmuch as
the item being purchased is the right to use the software as further cor-
rected, modified and enhanced, customers may reasonably view software
and maintenance services as a single product.
Furthermore, the functional integration of the results of mainte-
nance service-such as software code fixes, modifications, and enhance-
ments-with the underlying software code seems to argue for a finding of
a single product. This conclusion does not undermine the admonition of
the Court that the determination as to whether a single product exists
"turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the
character of the demand for the two items."124 Clearly, there is no de-
mand for the purchase of software maintenance services apart from the
purchase of the software license itself since the maintenance is useless
without the software.' 25 At the same time, other software maintenance
providers may not be able to lawfully provide similar services.
Maintenance of a software product generally requires access to the
human-readable source code. But many vendors do not provide their
licensees with source code, giving them only the object code necessary to
run the program. Those that do provide the source code concurrently
prohibit licensees from disclosing it to any third party. These measures
are legitimate precautions necessary to protect the trade secrets revealed
in the source code. Further, copyright law provides that software develop-
ers have the sole right to maintain copyrighted source code and to create
derivative works therefrom. By virtue of trade secret and copyright protec-
tion, then, third party service providers are precluded from accessing the
source code necessary to render maintenance services on the software. As
a result, no separate market for maintenance of proprietary software pro-
grams can exist without the authorization of the software developer.
Where no service competitors are foreclosed from providing maintenance
services, no antitrust concerns are implicated.
Before enjoining software tying arrangements by concluding that dis-
tinct products exist, courts should consider the policy implications. Prod-
uct innovation is the mainstay of the software industry. For software
developers, license and maintenance services packages allow them to con-
tinue improving the performance and efficiency of the software. The still
maturing software industry needs room to grow, and this requires that a
more flexible approach be applied than the traditional tying analysis.
Courts must recognize the competitive needs of the software industry in
determining whether software and related services are two distinct prod-
ucts or merely a single product composed of technology, both current and
124. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984).
125. For example, the court in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 693 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa.
1988), dealt with a hardware vendor who sold upgraded hardware parts with services to in-
stall such parts. Because there was no demand for the services separate from the demand for
the parts themselves, the plaintiff was unable to establish a separate demand for the services.
Id. at 289.
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future. The courts' failure to recognize the software industry's competi-
tive needs results in uncertainty for software developers. This uncertainty
would naturally inhibit further research and development following the
initial marketing of a software product, without any corresponding value
to the interests of consumers. Software developers would then have to
choose between foregoing the economic advantages of combining
software and services or risk incurring antitrust treble damages. A flexible
approach to resolving the single product issue, however, allows software
developers to enhance and improve their product, thus enabling them to
compete vigorously. The goals of encouraging innovation, of properly
recognizing industry practice, and of promoting competition would
thereby equitably be met.
IV. PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER
Appreciable economic power is presumed to exist in Sherman Act
tying cases when the tying product is patented. 126 The rationale for this
judicially-created presumption is that the grant of a patent or similar mo-
nopoly over a product means that the buyer cannot purchase the product
elsewhere, thus giving the seller market power. 127 The presumption de-
rives from cases involving "patent misuse," a doctrine which prevents a
patentee from exceeding its lawful monopoly rights granted under the
patent laws to gain advantage in another market. 128 Patent misuse is tradi-
tionally an affirmative defense to an infringement action that, if proven,
results in the effective suspension of the holder's statutory patent rights
during periods of misuse. 12 9 Conduct may constitute patent misuse with-
out rising to the level of an antitrust violation.' 3 0 While today the doctrine
of patent misuse is applied to a variety of conduct,' 8 ' it originated from
tying arrangements in which unpatented staple goods were tied to pat-
ented products.'
3 2
126. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
127. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-17. The concurrence in Jefferson Parish recognized,
however, that the presumption of market power is not always justified since "a patent holder
has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented
product." Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. For a historical discussion of "patent misuse," see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson
Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691, 696-97 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d
685 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
130. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
131. For example, patent misuse has been applied to the following practices: price fix-
ing, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); covenants not to compete by the patentee,
Stewart v. Mo-Trim, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 410 (S.D. Ohio 1975); territorial limitations,
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overrded on other grounds by 433
U.S. 36, 58 (1977); payment of royalties after expiration of the patent, Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); and payment of royalties based on sales of unpat-
ented products, Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 100-102.
132. Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie?, "4 HAxv.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (1991).
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After Congress indicated its disdain for tying by enacting the Clayton
Act, which expressly prohibited tying arrangements in goods,153 the
Supreme Court eventually borrowed the standard for patent misuse and
adapted it for antitrust tying claims.' 34 The Court announced that the use
of a patent monopoly to control competition in the market for an unpat-
ented product was, without more, an antitrust violation. 135 This "cross-
fertilization" between antitrust and patent misuse doctrine' 36 resulted in
the creation of the Sherman Act per se tying doctrine and the presump-
tion of market power.'
3 7
The Supreme Court extended the presumption to copyrighted prod-
ucts in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.138 The defendant in Para-
mount engaged in block booking of copyrighted feature films for movie
theaters. By block booking, the defendant tied the license of a desired
film to acceptance of the block of unwanted films. The Court reviewed
congressional intent behind the intellectual property laws, noting that the
"copyright monopoly" granted by Congress was intended to benefit pri-
marily the public by inducing creators to release their work, whereas re-
ward to the copyright owner was merely a secondary consideration. 1 39
Drawing upon prior patent misuse cases, the Paramount Court essentially
adopted the reasoning underlying the patent misuse rule. Any attempt to
extend the scope and value of one copyright to another product by way of
a tie, the Court ruled, should be condemned.' 40 Accordingly, the defend-
ant violated the Sherman Act for block booking copyrighted films.14 1 In
so ruling, the Paramount Court made no distinction between the rights
granted by patent law and the more limited rights granted by copyright.
Nor did the Court undertake any real analysis of antitrust principles. The
Paramount decision seems to be based simply on the finding that the de-
fendant improperly exceeded its intellectual property rights rather than
finding any separate violation of the antitrust laws.
133. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides, in relevant part:
[1]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to ... make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, .. . on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the ... purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such
... sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Id.
134. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
135. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator, 320 U.S. at 684.
136. Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 35.
137. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("Not only is
price-fidng unreasonable, per se,... but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competi-
tors from any substantial market.").
138. 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948).
139. Id. at 158.
140. Id. at 159.
141. Id. at 157-58.
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In United States v. Loew's InC.,14 2 the Supreme Court revisited its hold-
ing in Paramount. Again, the tie at issue involved the block booking of'
movies. 143 Though making no effort to consider the differences between
patents and copyright, the Loew's Court improved upon Paramount by ana-
lyzing independently the issues in an antitrust context. In affirming the
presumption of market power for copyrighted products, the Court first
appraised the anticompetitive effects of patent rights. The Court posited
that since the goal of patent law is to reward uniqueness, a patented prod-
uct must therefore itself be unique. 144 In turn, a patent's distinctiveness
meant that any tying arrangement involving a patented product necessar-
ily has anticompetitive consequences. 145 Citing Paramount, the Court sum-
marily adopted this logic for copyrighted products, thereby indicating that
any copyrighted product was legally and economically unique.146 Consid-
erations of market share and the availability of alternative products were
deemed irrelevant.147 The Court further noted that in the battle between
the "statutorily dispensed monopoly" in patented or copyrighted products
and principles of free competition, the latter must prevail. 148 Nonethe-
less, the Court did allow for future arguments that the presumption of
economic power does not apply to particular patented or copyrighted
products:
There may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine we have
enunciated under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying ar-
rangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products is
inapplicable. However, we find it difficult to conceive of such a
case, and the present case is clearly not one.
14 9
Citing the decisions in Paramount and Loew 's, other courts have ap-
plied the presumption of economic power when the tying product was
copyrighted software. For example, the defendant in Digidyne Corp. v. Data
General Corp.150 bundled the license of its copyrighted operating system
with the purchase of its central processing units. Expressly following
Loew's, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the copyright monopoly in the
software was sufficient to give rise to a presumption of requisite economic
power in that market.15 1 The court declined to consider evidence of func-
tionally equivalent operating systems, stating that competing substitutes
142. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
143. The facts were slightly different, though, in that the films in Loew's were sold to
television stations rather than movie theaters. Still, the factual difference was immaterial to
the Court's resolution. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 47-48.
144. Id. at 46.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 47 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
147. Id. at 47-48.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id. at 49-50. More recently, the Supreme Court cited the Paramount and Loew's rule
that a patent or similar monopoly will give rise to a presumption of market power. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984); Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 621 (1977).
150. 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
151. Id. at 1342. One lower court construed the Digidyne decision as relying upon more
than just the copyrighted software. The district court in Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F.
Supp. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), noted that the basis of the market power in Digidyne was the
fact that many users were financially locked into the defendant's operating system because it
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did not destroy the legal or economic distinctiveness of a copyrighted
product.152
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Digidyne, the Sixth Cir-
cuit flatly rejected an absolute presumption of market power for copy-
righted or patented products. In A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc.,153 the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that a patent or copyright holder
had no market power if close substitutes to the patented or copyrighted
item were available. The court described Loew's as "overbroad and inappo-
site to the instant case,"1 54 and further distinguished Digidyne based on a
fundamental difference in the facts.155 Whereas the Ninth Circuit found
that the software in Digidyne was particularly unique and recognized as the
best in the industry, the operating software in question in A.I. Root was not
especially unique or appealing. 156 Because the A.L Root software had close
substitutes, the fact that the software was copyrighted was not determina-
tive of market power. 157 With no further proof of market power present,
the court found no illegal tying arrangement.'
5 8
As the Sixth Circuit implicitly realized, the presumption of market
power as applied to copyrighted products is archaic and misapprehends
the fundamental nature of copyright law. There are generally three argu-
ments for the elimination of any presumption of market power for copy-
righted software products: (1) the casual application of a rule developed
for patent misuse defenses to cases involving copyrights ignores the tre-
mendous disparity between patent and copyright law;159 (2) the minimal
legal power attained under the copyright law does not equate with the sort
of economic force that is the basis of antitrust market power;' 60 and (3)
would be prohibitively expensive to reacquire application software designed to function with
a new operating system.
152. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1342. The appellate court also noted that there was evidence
that the defendant's software could not be reproduced without infringing on the defendant's
copyright and utilizing the defendant's trade secrets, which would require millions of dollars
and years of effort. The defense attempted to justify the tying by arguing that it was necessary
to allow the defendant to recover its research investment in developing the software. Unper-
suaded, the Ninth Circuit commented that an obvious, less restrictive alternative was simply
to restructure its prices for the software to reflect the relevant investment costs. Id. at 1344.
The First Circuit impliedly agreed with Digidyne in Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England,
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that the plaintiff had not shown the
existence of market power, the court, citing Digidyne, noted that the "plaintiff has made no
showing that [the tying product] had any special or unique features, such as patent or copy-
rights, that might demonstrate market power.")
153. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
154. Id at 676.
155. Id. at 677.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 676. In criticizing A.I. Root, one commentator states that the decision "was
based upon a law review Note, dicta by a single Supreme Court justice in a footnote unre-
lated to the case decided, an overruled district court decision, a disingenuous distinguishing
of a contrary Ninth Circuit decision squarely on point, and a rule of its own making with no
basis in Supreme Court antitrust law." Dik, supra note 2, at 440.
158. A.I. Root, 806 F.2d at 675.
159. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
160. See infta notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
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the presence of alternative software products demonstrates that any pre-
sumption of market power is inappropriate to computer software. 16 1
A. Application of Patent Rule to Copyrights
The historical basis for applying the presumption to copyrighted
products is founded upon an inherently flawed analogy to patent misuse
cases. For instance, Paramount and Loew 's relied upon considerations of
patent misuse and were not based on any concept of copyright misuse.
The obvious reason was that, at the time of those decisions, copyright mis-
use was not an accepted doctrine. The Court made no mention of this
crucial inconsistency in either case, apparently ignoring the issue in its
unwavering attempt to link patent misuse with antitrust claims involving
tying of copyrighted films. Indeed, even today, much skepticism remains
as to whether copyright misuse is a valid theory or simply a mistaken ex-
pansion of the patent misuse doctrine.
162
Patent misuse is not an independent antitrust violation, but is more
properly a defense to an action for patent infringement.16 3 Because a
party need not show any anticompetitive effects to establish misuse, con-
duct that may qualify as patent misuse in an infringeient action will not
necessarily qualify as an antitrust violation.'6 Similarly, to show misuse a
party does not have to prove that it was harmed, while an antitrust plaintiff
must establish injury in his or her business or property.165 Thus, when
patent misuse is proven in an antitrust action, a court must still conduct a
separate analysis to determine if the patent misuse violates the antitrust
laws. In this respect, the Paramount decision, 166 in which the Court con-
cluded that an antitrust violation had occurred based solely on the finding
that the defendant had attempted to expand its copyright to other prod-
ucts, is clearly unjustified.
Congress itself perceived the inappropriateness of the presumption of
market power. After much debate about the inequity of the presumption,
Congress amended the Patent Act to provide that a patent holder will not
be guilty of patent misuse by reason of having
161. See infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Reliability Research Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 3 Computer Cas.
(CCH) 46,720, at 64,531 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that copyright misuse is "an open and
disputed question of law"); Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive
Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 629
(1991) (concluding that copyright misuse is too penalizing a remedy). In Lasercomb Am., Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), copyright misuse was applied by the court to a
software license prohibition against the licensees' developing or selling software which would
compete with the licensed software. Two commentators describe the Lasercomb decision as "a
software licensor's worst nightmare." SeeJere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Recent Devel-
opment, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
257, 258 (1991).
163. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986).
164. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (upholding patent
misuse defense while denying antitrust claim).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
166. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
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conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view
of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.
167
Thus, Congress expressed its disagreement with the judicially-created pre-
sumption of market power, at least in the context of patent misuse de-
fenses. Inasmuch as the presumption of market power in antitrust tying
cases is historically based on rules developed in patent misuse, and not
copyright misuse cases, the fact that the patent misuse law has now
changed to eliminate any presumption of market power provides ample
grounds for courts to abolish the presumption in antitrust actions involv-
ing copyrights.
16 8
It is equally incongruous to apply mechanically a rule developed in
the context of patents to cases involving copyrights. Any analogy between
patents and copyrights is intrinsically suspect. A copyright holder's exclu-
sive rights are much more limited than patent rights. A patent provides a
strong exclusionary power: once a patent is granted, no one else has the
right to develop independently the same or a substantial equivalent to the
patented product. 169 The copyright holder, however, simply retains the
sole right to reproduce, distribute, and create derivative works of the copy-
righted work. 170 Copyright law does not forbid others from indepen-
dently creating identical works, nor does it protect the ideas underlying
the copyrighted work. Thus nothing in the Copyright Act prohibits a po-
tential licensee from using the ideas derived from a copyrighted product
and creating a similar work, provided that the underlying copyrighted
product is not unlawfully copied.
In sum, the exceptional disparity in the exclusive rights granted by
patent law as opposed to copyright law makes blind analogies between pat-
ent and copyright dubious at best.17 ' As the Paramount and Loew's hold-
167. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
168. Still, the House of Representatives deleted a corresponding proposal to eliminate
the patent and copyright presumption of market power applied in antitrust tying cases. 134
CONG. REc. H10,649 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988). Compare 134 CONG. Rac. S17,148 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1988) (even after the House deleted the proposal to destroy the presumption in
antitrust cases, Senator Leahy averred that "the Senate is clearly sending a message to the
courts that they would be mistaken to continue to apply any presumption of market power
involving intellectual property rights as automatically granting meaningful economic power
over a particular market in antitrust cases") with Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
771 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (ruling that the amendment to the Patent Act did not
implicitly revoke Supreme Court precedent establishing a presumption of market power in
antitrust tying cases). If the court in Grid Systems is correct, the following anomaly results: in
the same case, the court will require evidence of market power in analyzing the patent misuse
defense to an infringement action, while at the same time presuming market power in ruling
on the antitrust claim. See Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 23.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
170. Id. § 271. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
171. See Ralph C. Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 794 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1986) (using a different standard to analyze territorial restraints under copyright than
that which would have been applied to similar restraints under a patent).
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ings rest on an analogy to patent cases, the precedential value of such
decisions should now be highly questionable.
B. Presumption of Market Power Is Not Economically Sound
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the presumption of mar-
ket power is that the presumption finds little basis in economic reality. A
copyright does not truly confer market power by itself.17 2 As many artists
have experienced, the creation of a copyrighted product does not dictate
that there will be any demand for it or that the product will be more entic-
ing to consumers than any other product.1 73 Rather, the various attrib-
utes of the particular product and the reputation of the creator will
determine its desirability. For instance, an unknown singer may record
her music, but the mere fact that the music is copyrighted will not foster
any demand for the recording. There is no singular characteristic, then,
that makes copyrighted material inherently more desirable to the public
than any other product.
The presumption of market power assumes that there are no substi-
tutes because of the legal power granted by the copyright. One obvious
deficiency in that assumption is based on the copyright rule, which pro-
vides that ideas that can be expressed only in one way are not copyright-
able. 17 4 Thus, material is by statute copyrightable only if functional
equivalents are possible. 175 Similarly, copyright law does not prevent
others from duplicating the ideas and developing equivalent products. 176
Nor does copyright law prohibit independent development of even the
copyrightable aspects of a product. Where others are thereby free to pro-
duce their own equivalents, copyright holders may achieve little market
power. The availability of substitutes from competitors necessarily defies
any presumption of market power.
177
172. For this reason, a number of commentators have argued against the presumption of
market power. See Warren G. Lavey, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks as Sources of Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 27 ATrrRusr BuLL. 433 (1982); William Montgomery, Note, The 1e-
sumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1140 (1985); Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67
MINN. L. REv. 1198 (1983).
173. See Rosemary S. Thompson, Comment, Old Laws v. New Technology: Antediluvian Anti-
trust Tying Prohibitions and Operating System Software, 2 SorwAR L.J. 221, 238 (1988) ("As
many poor software developers, authors, and artists can attest, the granting of copyright does
not automatically create economic power resulting from demand for a product.").
174. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (recent application in a computer context).
175. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
176. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I1. 1979), aftd,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
177. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (recognizing that sellers of patented or copyrighted products have no market
power "in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product"); Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (commenting that a patent
does not necessarily confer market power); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 235-
39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the existence of a copyright is not the only factor in determining market
power); 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (the fact
that defendant's software was copyrighted did not establish the defendant possessed eco-
nomic power); see also Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 74 ("It is clear that in an economic sense,
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The "fair use" exception to the copyright law, which permits limited
free use of a copyrighted product for news reporting and educational pur-
poses,178 further diminishes the market power that a copyright accords.
Additional handicaps to obtaining market power by virtue of a copyright
include the public's right to library and archival reproduction of copy-
'righted material.
1 79
The presumption of market power also fails because it does not con-
sider cross-elasticity of demand by consumers. Where substitutes are avail-
able, consumer demand may be quite responsive to price changes in any
particular product. This means that if two products are essentially
equivalent in the eyes of the public, an increase in the price of one will
cause consumers to shift their purchase to the other product.18 0 Thus,
cross-elasticity of demand would tend to negate market power. Because
the subject matter of copyrighted products is highly substitutable, the pre-
sumption of market power makes no economic sense.
These arguments make clear the importance of distinguishing be-
tween legal and economic power. The limited legal power granted by in-
tellectual property law does not automatically equate to any economic
power that may result therefrom.1 8 1 Because a copyright does not in-
nately create economic power in any relevant sense, the presumption of
market power is unwarranted.
C. The Presumption Is Inappropriate for Software
Even assuming that the presumption of market power is conceivably
justified in some copyrighted product markets, it is inappropriate for
software technology. As an example, the presumption of economic power
may be more acceptable as applied to movies since it is the expression
itself that makes a movie valuable. The trial court in Loew's recognized
that the block-booked feature films "varied in theme, in artistic perform-
ance, in stars, in audience appeal, etc."18 2 Certainly Havana will not suf-
fice for viewers who wish to see Casablanca, although both carry the same
underlying theme.18 3 It is the expression, then, that bestows the essential
the essential element of market power is negated if there are acceptable substitutes for the
tying product available from others at comparable prices.").
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
179. Id. § 108.
180. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
181. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 & n.4 (9th
Cir. 1987) (dicta suggesting that the court might be inclined to reverse its holding that eco-
nomic power should be presumed simply from the fact that a product is copyrighted), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); see also Terry M. Kee, Note, The Presumption of Market Power in Sales
of Legally Differentiated Tying Products, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1305, 1306 (1978) (demonstrating the
economic invalidity of the presumption of sufficient market power with legally differentiated
products). But see Dik, supra note 2 (attacking tying arrangements involving copyrighted
software as being undesirable and unnecessary restraints and arguing that the presumption
of economic advantage is appropriate to copyrighted software).
182. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), vacated, 371 U.S.
38 (1962).
183. Both movies occur in cities on the brink of war. The suave male lead in both begins
a romantic liaison with a beautiful woman whose husband is presumed dead. When the hus-
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value of the film. Unlike movies, however, the primary value of software
tends to be the ideas or the underlying functionality contained in the
software, rather than the expression.' 8 4 Typically, users are principally
concerned with the functions that a program provides and may well be
unable to distinguish between two functionally equivalent programs, de-
spite the fact that neither is a copy of the other. In such circumstances,
neither of the equivalent programs would necessarily capture any signifi-
cant market power, particularly if other alternatives are available.
Perhaps an example will best illustrate the point. ABC Company in-
dependently develops a computer program for balancing a checkbook.
ABC's program is rather basic, without exceptional features not found in
any of the other checkbook balancing programs. If ABC were to tie its
program to the purchase of pre-printed checks, it would be presumed
under the Paramount edict to have market power in the market for the
computer software program. But the facts may strongly refute the pres-
ence of any economic power capable of forcing consumers to purchase
the package. Assuming ABC Company has no other copyrighted pro-
grams that provide similar functionality, it would have minimal market
share, if any. Despite Loew's contention that all copyrighted products are
unique, the program may not be particularly unusual or distinctive in a
way discernible to consumers. Yet ABC Company would be penalized by a
presumption that, in this instance, bears no relation to economic
reality.
185
Furthermore, even if a software developer attains some competitive
advantage upon the introduction of an innovative new software product,
any corresponding market power may be short-lived. Technology changes
rapidly in software markets, with consumer demand quickly shifting to the
latest innovation. As with other high technology industries, software devel-
opers attempt to duplicate or even to improve the functionality of their
competitors' products. Consequently, the development of a desirable new
product may actually serve to encourage competition and lead to the crea-
tion of better products. In short, because the desire for software is sub-
stantially different from that for movies, courts should not extend the
presumption of market power created under Paramount and Loew's to
software products.
band miraculously reappears alive, the hero in each risks his life in order to save the woman
and her husband, allowing the couple to escape the husband's political enemies, together
and unharmed, leaving the hero alone. Despite Robert Redford's playing the male lead in
Havana, the movie achieved less than rave reviews and is relatively unrenowned. Casablanca,
on the other hand, starring Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman, received several Acad-
emy Awards and is one of the best-loved movies of all time.
184. Thomas L. Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works,
and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 105 (1986), reprinted in 4
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, app. B-7, at B74.
185. Although examples can invariably be drafted to prove there are exceptions to virtu-
ally every rule, the illustration provided is not an extreme one. With computer programming
rapidly becoming a standard skill, the number of copyrightable computer programs in exist-
ence is abundant. Many functions may each be accomplished by a variety of programs, thus
leading to the conclusion that few program functions are actually unique or distinctive.
[Vol. 71:3
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It is clear that the market power presumption developed in yester-
year's world of goods does not always apply to today's complex technology.
Existing case law reflects the courts' willingness to modify certain antitrust
rules in the face of changing market practices.18 6 Courts should do the
same in this context. Recognition that the presumption of market power
is inapposite to copyrighted software would properly account for the rele-
vant market realities, while not diminishing the goals of antitrust law.
18 7
Despite the convincing arguments against the presumption of market
power, it would be equally senseless to disregard entirely the fact that a
tying product is copyrighted. Certainly, the advantages obtained from a
patent, copyright, trade secret, or similar right, may have some bearing on
the analysis. The point is that a copyright should not by itself prove eco-
nomic power.
VI. VALIDITY OF A FLEXIBLE APPROACH
Recognition that a particular industry exhibits unique competitive cir-
cumstances that mandate the use of a more flexible approach is not with-
out precedent. The Supreme Court has approved of less restrictive rules
when circumstances failed to justify per se rules. For example, in NCAA v.
Board of Regents,188 the Supreme Court considered horizontal price fixing
and output limitations by the athletic association. Typically, horizontal re-
straints of trade are among the classes of activity considered per se viola-
tions of the antitrust rules.1 8 9 However, the Court concluded that despite
the general rule, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule be-
186. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-59 (1977) (ac-
knowledging that the previous per se rule against territorial restraints might preclude clearly
pro-competitive conduct); Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 143-46 (7th Cir.)
(conceding that a per se rule condemning the practice of licensing only certain persons
could critically affect technology development), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
In his renowned treatise on trade secrets, Professor Milgrim argues for judicial review,
from time to time, of archaic per se rules and policies which may no longer suffice:
[My] bias is not necessarily against the antitrust laws insofar as they serve the in-
tended purpose, but rather against a blind adherence to rules and principles enun-
ciated in one context and then slavishly, perhaps unthinkingly, applied to all
following factual configurations, no matter how imperfectly the concepts and their
formulations fit the later facts. Most simply put, the antitrust rules enunciated in
simpler times and a less trying economic, social and political climate, cannot possi-
bly be exempt from scrutiny, discussion, criticism and question if our country is to
face the challenges of today.
2 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, § 10.01 [2] [a], at 10-40.
187. While it is fallacious to presume market power simply because a software product is
copyrighted, such a presumption is more clearly erroneous when applied to trade secrets. A
software program's source code may be protected under trade secret laws, and the exclusion-
ary rights associated with trade secrets are far less extensive than those granted by patents or
copyrights. So long as they do not employ unfair or dishonest means, any competitor or
customer is free to develop identical trade secrets. Such freedom greatly decreases the an-
ticompetitive effect of restraints that trade secret licensors may attempt to impose. As a result,
trade secrets should not induce a presumption of market power. See 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Belvis, supra note 90, at 272 n.33 (noting
that the presumption of market power has never been applied to trade secrets).
188. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
189. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).
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cause the case involved "an industry in which horizontal restraints on com-
petition are essential if the product is to be available at all." 190 The Court
therefore applied the rule of reason, noting that regardless of the type of
analysis-per se or rule of reason-the ultimate inquiry to determine
whether the challenged restraint lessened competition remained the
same.191
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationeyr & Printing
Co.,' 19 2 the Supreme Court was confronted with a group boycott by whole-
sale purchasing cooperatives. While acknowledging that group boycotts
are normally considered per se anticompetitive, the Court conceded that
the conduct in question was "not a form of concerted activity characteristi-
cally likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects." 193 Accord-
ingly, the Court ruled that the district court properly rejected application
of the per se rule to the group boycott in question.
1 94
Indeed, the Court has affirmatively stated that there should be a pre-
sumption in favor of using the rule of reason.19 5 Based on such prece-
dent, and recognizing that software tying arrangements may have
procompetitive effects, the courts should be willing to use more flexible
standards in examining the anticompetitive impact of software tying
arrangements.
CONCLUSION
Applying the rigid rules developed in decisions involving tying ar-
rangements to software and maintenance packages is contrary to the im-
portant policy of encouraging innovation. The survival of the software
industry and of its members depends upon the ability of software develop-
ers to improve the performance, functionality, and efficiency of their
software. It seems entirely inconsistent with the goal of fostering research
and development to use the antitrust label to prohibit mechanistically a
software licensor from selling a combination of software and maintenance
services, when the net effect of such a package is socially and economically
desirable. Accordingly, the courts should use a more flexible standard in
testing the antitrust implications of software/maintenance packages. A
good starting point would be to recognize that such packages may indeed
be an integrated, single product and that the presumption of market
power applied to copyrighted products is inapplicable to software technol-
ogy and unsupported by economic reality. By making an effort to inter-
pret antitrust laws as consistent with the goals of intellectual property
protection, the courts will properly foster an- innovative spirit that will ben-
efit software developers and society alike.
190. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
191. Id. at 103-04.
192. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
193. Id at 295.
194. Id. at 298.
195. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
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